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Abstract
Cholera is still a major cause of disease epidemics in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). During the 
period January 2017–March 2018, 15 countries in the WHO African Region (AFR) reported 
cholera outbreaks of varying magnitudes. Zimbabwe has experienced cholera outbreaks 
dating as far back as 1971 with an unprecedented outbreak occurring in 2008/2009 when 
60 of the 62 districts in the country were affected. The outbreak was declared over in May 
2009 and by then, 98,592 cases and 4288 deaths had been reported. In Zimbabwe, outbreaks 
have occurred against a backdrop of a struggling economy and a weak health system. The 
role of a resilient health system in emergencies response is accentuated premised on experi-
ences from the Ebola outbreak that largely affected three countries in West Africa. Amidst 
economic and persistent system wide challenges faced by Zimbabwe, preparedness and 
response capacity has been built over the years. This is evidenced by the rapid response and 
containment of the recent cholera outbreak. Skilled and equipped rapid response teams, 
strengthened surveillance and maintaining high alert, effective multisectoral collaboration 
and high level political engagement are among the critical elements that have built resilience.
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1. Introduction
Disease outbreaks are a common occurrence and often result in untoward suffering and loss 
of life. Delayed response has led to loss of life, economic losses and disruption of health 
© 2018 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
systems which are already weak especially in low income countries. Researchers estimated 
the real total economic loss attributable to cholera in the WHO African Region (WHO AFR) 
as US$38,958,750 assuming a minimum regional life expectancy of 40 years; US$53,240,859 
assuming a regional average life expectancy of 53 years; and US$64,208,880 assuming 
a maximum regional life expectancy of 73 years using 2015 figures [1]. Further, the three 
Ebola virus disease (EVD) hard hit countries in West Africa lost an estimated $2.8 billion in 
gross domestic product (GDP) [2]. Drawing from the experience of the three EVD affected 
countries in West Africa, the social and economic impact would have been less profound if 
health systems were strong to respond to the outbreak. The health system capacity in Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone was suboptimal [3]. Essential health systems functions were not in 
place negatively impacting timely response to the outbreak. Scholars accentuate the role of 
resilient health systems to guard against loss of life, and collapse of basic health care services 
in the face of a crisis [4].
1.1. History of cholera and risk factors
Cholera, an enteric infection caused by the bacterium Vibrio cholerae, causes diarrhea that can 
lead to severe dehydration and death in people of all ages. Cholera is transmitted through 
ingestion of food or water contaminated with the bacterium Vibrio cholerae and can lead to 
explosive, widespread epidemics. Humans carry and spread the disease globally. If untreated, 
the case fatality rate can be as high as 50% while up to 80% of all infections will have only 
mild or no symptoms at all [5]. Cholera is traced as far back as the nineteenth century when it 
spread across the world from its original reservoir in the Ganges delta in India. Since then, six 
subsequent pandemics have been reported across all continents which have killed millions of 
people. The current pandemic is the seventh which arrived in Africa in 1971. Estimates show 
that each year, 1.3–4.0 million cholera cases, and 21,000–143,000 deaths occur worldwide due 
to cholera [6].
During the period January 2017 to March 2018, 15 countries in the WHO African Region 
(AFR) reported cholera outbreaks of varying magnitudes [7]-as shown in Table 1. Risk factors 
for cholera include poor sanitation and hygiene, inadequate access to safe water [8], reduced 
or nonexistent stomach acid, cohabitation in the same household with someone who has the 
disease, type of blood group, consumption of contaminated food and raw or undercooked 
shellfish [9]. Having an unprotected water source close to the residence, drinking poorly 
treated water and eating away from home [10] have also been cited as risk factors. Other 
studies highlight bathing in the river, long distance to water source, and eating dried fish as 
risk factors [11]. Furthermore, scholars draw our attention to a possible correlation between 
socio-economic and demographic indices as factors that might serve as national risk predic-
tors with the assertion that, infant mortality and the human development index may denote 
a risk of sustained transmission of cholera [12]. On the contrary however, other research-
ers found no association between the risk of cholera and socio-economic factors although 
they highlight the association between occurrence of severe dehydration in cholera patients 
and the household size [13]. Peri-urban slums and camps for internally displaced persons or 
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refugees are typically at risk due to challenges of accessing adequate safe water and good 
sanitation facilities [12].
In this chapter, we focus on cholera which is still a major cause of disease epidemics in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). We review the trend of cholera in Zimbabwe and how the country has 
built resilience overtime. Our findings provide lessons to other countries who are seeking to 
put in place measures to control cholera and other diseases outbreaks.
Country Date of notification to WHO Date of latest report Cases Deaths CFR
Angola 15 Dec 2017 25 Mar 2018 861 15 1.7%
Angola 15 Dec 2016 22 Oct 2017 375 21 5.6%
Burundi 20 Aug 2017 31 Dec 2017 171 0 0%
Chad 19 Aug 2017 10 Dec 2017 1250 81 6.5%
DRC 1 Jan 2018 4 Mar 2018 6080 140 2.3%
DRC 1 Jan 2017 4 Mar 2018 60,492 1288 2.1%
Kenya 1 Jan 2018 16 Mar 2018 1910 41 2.1%
Kenya 6 Mar 2017 31 Dec 2017 4079 76 1.9%
Malawi 28 Nov 2017 28 Mar 2018 844 26 3.1%
Mozambique 12 Aug 2017 25 Mar 18 2285 5 0.2%
Mozambique 16 Feb 2017 13 Mar 2017 1400 3 0.2%
Namibia 31 Jan 2018 2 Mar 2018 1 1 0.0%
Nigeria 7 Jun 2017 3 Mar 2018 5058 126 2.4%
South Africa 26 Feb 2018 10 Mar 2018 1 0 0
South Sudan 25 Aug 2016 7 Feb 2018 20,438 436 2.1%
Tanzania 20 Aug 2015
(Cases from 1 Jan 2018)
25 Mar 2018 1445 27 1.9%
Tanzania 20 Aug 2015
(Cases from 1 Jan 2017)
31 Dec 2017 4627 95 2%
Uganda 28 Sep 2017 30 Jan 2018 250 4 1.6%
Uganda 15 Feb 2018 25 Mar 2018 1901 39 2.1%
Zambia 4 Oct 2017 25 Mar 2018 5190 103 2.0%
Zimbabwe 22 Jan 2018 24 Mar 2018 111 4 3.6%
Total 118,769 2531 2.1%
Source: WHO/AFRO Weekly bulletins on outbreaks and emergencies, January 2017–March 2018.
Table 1. Countries in the WHO AFR that have reported cholera outbreaks: January 2017–March 2018.
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2. Methods
2.1. Defining resilience
Health systems must have the capacity to effectively respond to crises and maintain core 
functions before, during and after crises. Resilience refers to patterns of positive adaptation in 
the context of significant risk or adversity [14]. A range of definitions for resilience have been 
proposed including a stable trajectory of healthy functioning after a highly adverse event; a 
conscious effort to move forward in an insightful and integrated positive manner as a result 
of lessons learned from an adverse experience; the capacity of a dynamic system to adapt 
successfully to disturbances that threaten the viability, function, and development of that 
system; and a process to harness resources in order to sustain well-being [15]. Resilient health 
systems are defined as health systems that are aware of inherent strengths and weaknesses; 
diverse with the capacity to respond to a broad range of challenges; self-regulating with the 
ability to isolate health threats while continuing to deliver core health services; integrated, 
and bringing in diverse actors from health and non-health actors as well as local and interna-
tional players in a smart dependence; and adaptive with the ability to transform in ways that 
improve function in adverse situations [4]. In all these definitions resilient is understood in 
terms of a continuum of positive response in the face of adverse events.
2.2. Approach to the review
Four of the authors were involved in the response efforts and their insights are provided here 
along with the review of important literature on the outbreak. The literature yielded informa-
tion on the nature and trend of cholera response activities between 2008 and to date, and pro-
vided insights into changes in the health system over the same period that may have had an 
effect on the response to epidemics. The review took place between February and May 2018.
3. History of cholera in Zimbabwe
The first recorded cholera case in Zimbabwe was in Mashonaland East Province (Mudzi dis-
trict) in 1972. In the same year another outbreak was reported in Mashonaland Central (Mt 
Darwin district) [16]. Thereafter outbreaks occurred every 10 years until 1992. More frequent 
outbreaks occurred in the late 1990s, with the largest being recorded in 1999 when 4081 cases 
were reported in low lying border areas covering six provinces. Since the year 2000, chol-
era outbreaks were reported on an annual basis, with unprecedented outbreaks occurring 
in 2008/2009, when 60 of the 62 districts in the country were affected, and by the time the 
outbreak was declared over in May 2009, 98,592 cases and 4288 deaths had been reported [17]. 
The 2008/2009 cholera outbreak tested the strength of the Zimbabwe emergency preparedness 
and response at a time when the country was ill prepared for emergencies. Smaller outbreaks 
occurred in 2010 and 2011 each covering four districts and recording 1022 and 1140 cases 
respectively but these were controlled in reasonable time given the built response capacity 
from the 2008/2009 outbreak. After 2011, the country continued reporting cholera outbreaks 
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on an annual basis to date with varying magnitudes. Remarkably, from 2012, all the out-
breaks have been controlled at source without further spread to other districts. Chiredzi and 
Chipinge districts remained as hot spots with cases coming from these two districts for most 
years. Table 2 shows cholera cases and deaths in Zimbabwe from 2008 to March 2018.
Since 2008, most of the cholera outbreaks in Zimbabwe were in urban settlements where the 
main drivers of cholera included the overloaded and dilapidated water and sanitation infra-
structure which has been deteriorating over the years, inadequate water, contaminated water 
sources and poor water storage [18, 19]. In addition, cultural practices such as unsafe handling 
of corpses during burials add to the list of risk factors. In most of the reported outbreaks a great 
number of cases had been associated with deaths and reported to have attended a funeral [17].
4. Response to cholera outbreaks overtime
4.1. The period from 2008 to 2009
4.1.1. The health system
Zimbabwe’s health system is built under the principle of primary health care, with a district 
health system anchored on a district hospital and a network of rural health centers (RHC) or 
clinics providing first line health services. The district health system is supported by provin-
cial hospitals at tertiary level and central hospitals at national level stationed in the two major 
cities of the country.
The first line health facilities are serviced by nurses, for curative services and environmental 
health technicians (EHT) to support public health preventive services in the community. In 
addition to nurses, for curative services, the district level has doctors, laboratory scientists and 
Year Cases Deaths Number of districts affected
2008/2009 98,592 4288 60
2010 1022 22 4
2011 1140 45 4
2012 22 1 1
2013 2 0 1
2014 0 0 No
2015 42 0 6
2016 4 1 2
2017 6 3 3
2018 111 4 2
1Source: National Health information and surveillance, Ministry of Health and Child Care, Zimbabwe.
Table 2. Cholera cases and deaths in Zimbabwe between 2008 and March 20181.
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other clinical and public health experts. The ideal for the country is two to three nurses and 
one EHT for every RHC. The district hospital is ideally supposed to be supported by 50–100 
nurses, and three to eight doctors depending on the size. From independence, the supply of 
health workers improved up to about year 2000, when almost all the district hospitals had at 
least one doctor. Nurses’ coverage at RHC level had been improving up to a time when every 
RHC had at least one nurse.
The health system, during the period 2008–2009, was far from being resilient and being able 
to absorb shocks whilst maintaining normal functionality. By the time the 2008/2009 cholera 
outbreak struck, the health system was at its weakest. It was characterized by a critical short-
age of skilled as well as motivated health workers; critical shortages of essential medicines 
and supplies and medical technologies; dilapidated health infrastructure; unreliable health 
information systems and weak surveillance systems; poor service delivery and poor health 
stewardship under inexperienced health leadership [20]. In one study on community mortal-
ity from Cholera in Zimbabwe, the poor access to health services and limited availability of 
oral rehydration salts were some of the causes for high community mortality [20].
The health system was dysfunctional as far as promoting provision of core health services 
because of the nationwide economic decline and staff attrition. For instance, most health 
workers including nurses, doctors, EHTs and laboratory scientist left for greener pastures 
either within or outside the country leaving RHCs without nurses and many district hospitals 
without doctors [21]. This left the health system poorly serviced by human resources [22]. 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the ratio of health workers per 1000 
population was 0.162 in 2004 dropping to 0.05 in 2007 for physicians and that for nurses and 
midwives dropping from 1.491 in 1995 to 1.215 in 2009 [23]. With the country’s economy at 
its worst, affected by hyperinflation, financing for health was at its lowest during this period. 
Total health expenditure was 8.9% of GDP, with out of pocket expenditure constituting 50.4% 
of health expenditure [24]. Total health expenditure per capita was estimated at $16.21 in 2008 
[25]. As such, surge capacity was nonexistent. With the lack of confidence in the health system 
a good proportion of the population was seeking for health care elsewhere which meant that 
some threats would not be detected by the health system late. Such a system could not adapt, 
transform and improve performance in the face of an outbreak.
An up-to-date map of human, physical, and information assets that highlight areas of strength 
and vulnerability was not in place. Real time strategic health information and epidemiological 
surveillance systems as well as the use of indicator and event based surveillance systems were 
not in place. Some information was however available on the vulnerabilities of the popula-
tion to different threats although not well disseminated to impel action. The functionality of 
the health information network was at its lowest, human resources were poorly motivated 
and not available at work to record surveillance data, analyze it and use the information for 
decision making. The surveillance system which was then largely paper based and not real 
time was severely affected by the transport and communication systems which were also at 
a low level.
Resilient systems have the ability to harness human, financial and logistical resources from 
health and non-health fields, coordinate actors and manage partnerships. The strength of 
the country was the availability of inbuilt structures for coordination including the Civil 
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Protection Committee at all levels of the system, chaired by the local government ministry. 
Although this committee remained functional, due to the poor economic performance all 
actors’ roles in responding to the outbreak were constrained. Although international players 
were eager and willing to provide support, the country did not declare the cholera outbreak 
as an emergency in sufficient time to allow inflow of such support. This is evidenced by the 
fact that although the first official report of the outbreak was on 22 August 2008, unofficial 
reports had been circulating in the media much earlier. Since the first official report of the 
outbreak became public, the Government was silent on the issue until December 2008, when 
the Minister of Health and Child Welfare eventually declared the cholera outbreak a state of 
emergency. After this declaration of a state of emergency, donors responded immediately and 
provided financial support through UN agencies and NGOs to fight the cholera outbreak.
4.1.2. Status on IHR and IDSR
The International Health Regulations (2005), or IHR (2005), represents a binding international 
legal instrument involving 196 countries across the globe, including all the WHO Member 
States. The purpose and scope of the IHR (2005) is “to prevent, protect against, control and 
provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are com-
mensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interfer-
ence with international traffic and trade.” The IHR (2005), to which Zimbabwe is a signatory, 
has shaped the country’s preparedness [26], prevention and response efforts to public health 
risks, but only after the 2008/2009 cholera outbreak.
The IHR (2005) sets guidelines for core capacities which must be implemented in order to 
prevent or respond to disease outbreaks and other public health events of international con-
cern. This includes strengthening of core capacities at ports of entry to prevent exit or entry 
of infectious hazards. Alongside this is enabling legislation, establishment and strengthening 
IHR national focal points for the coordination of stakeholders and reporting of diseases of 
public health importance to WHO.
The 2008/2009 cholera outbreak occurred outside the period of implementation of IHR (2005) 
for the country which was to start in 2011 with discussions and base-lining of country capaci-
ties for implementation of IHR (2005). State parties, in line with IHR (2005), are required to 
strengthen capacities in preparedness and response efforts. This requires countries to have 
multi-hazards national public health emergency preparedness and response plans which 
have to be periodically tested, including identification of hot spots and developing mecha-
nisms for resource pooling and deployment during times of emergencies. This kind of plan 
did not exist before the 2008/2009 cholera outbreak.
Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) was adopted as a tool for detection and 
response to epidemics by the WHO Regional Committee for Africa in 1998. In Zimbabwe, 
training modules were developed between 2001 and 2007, national adaptation carried out, 
training of trainers and training of health workers conducted. Although the training of trainers 
covered the whole country, cascade training of health workers was at a slower pace because 
of the limited financial resources. This capacity in IDSR was later to be negatively affected by 
the health worker attrition. With the coming of IHR (2005) AFR member states agreed that the 
implementation of IHR (2005) in Africa was going to be through IDSR.
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4.1.3. Magnitude of the 2008/2009 outbreak and response efforts
This outbreak, described as the worst the country has ever experienced, resulted in 98,592 
cases and 4288 deaths with all provinces, and 60 of the 63 districts in the country affected. 
The outbreak toll could have been reduced were it not for the lack of resilience in the health 
system and the adverse macroeconomic and political climate.
The 2008/2009 cholera outbreak came amid repeated calls by all sectors that Harare City Council 
urgently resolves the dilapidated water and sanitation infrastructure. The outbreak came at a 
time when the country was experiencing its worst economic downturn when most health insti-
tutions were closed down due to unavailability of health workers. Health service delivery was 
left to non-governmental organizations (NGO). The outbreak response was marred by sluggish 
response due to several reasons among which were weak health systems and leadership.
Apart from the human resources, the resources required to implement a rapid response 
where not available at the initial stages of the outbreak because of economic challenges. The 
harsh economic climate characterized by hyperinflation meant that the common people did 
not have sufficient funds to get them to the health facility as well as procure the sugar and salt 
for preparing the oral rehydration solution [20].
4.2. The period: 2010–to date
4.2.1. Building resilience
The situation gradually improved with the various interventions by the government and 
donor community realizing that there would be no good implementation of donor supported 
programs without public sector human resources for health. This led to various schemes to 
support retention of key health personnel at implementation levels including the creation of 
human resource retention schemes as part of the Global Fund and the Health Development 
Fund (then the Health Transition Fund). These schemes improved the availability of medi-
cines and supplies for health including human resources which improved the country’s 
responsiveness to emergencies.
With the support of partners, health commodities called the primary care packages were 
deployed to the health facilities at a regular basis using an approach called the Zimbabwe 
Informed Push System (ZIP). This improved the availability of medicines and as soon as the 
situation stabilized, the National Pharmaceutical Company (Natpharm) was capacitated to 
resume its role as the national supplier of pharmaceuticals and the distribution of medicines 
reverted back to the pull system. The pull system is whereby the distribution of medicines by 
Natpharm is on a quarterly basis in response to orders placed by health facilities. The imple-
mentation of the pull system followed an intermediary assisted pull system where the district 
pharmacists made quarterly visits to health facilities and assisted them in placing orders to 
Natpharm based on the stock levels.
The health information and surveillance system also improved quite significantly with the 
introduction of the District Health Information Software (DHIS) version 1.4, and then latter 
version 2.1. For reporting of outbreaks and other public health events under the rapid disease 
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notification system (RDNS), the Front line SMS® was adopted for reporting from initial 1200 
cell phones procured under the Global Fund using the DHIS 2.1. This system started in 2012 
and improved reporting of the weekly disease surveillance system (WDSS) from about 40% to 
above 90% by 2015, and has maintained timeliness and completeness of the weekly reporting 
at above 95% from 2015 to 2018 (MOHCC WDSS Reports, 2015–2018).
The initiative to strengthen Rapid Response Teams (RRTs) started during the cholera out-
break of 2008/2009. Tools for guiding RRTs were developed which included the Guidelines 
for Rapid Response Teams and training of RRTs at all levels. In 2011 a Compendium for Rapid 
Response Teams was developed to guide the work of these teams. Cascade training of RRTs 
was carried out since then and in 2016, following the Harare typhoid outbreak, another train-
ing of RRTs from 20 priority districts was carried out, mainly focusing on case management 
and surveillance. The IDSR technical guidelines and training manuals were revised in 2011 
and used for training of health workers at all identified outbreak response levels. However 
because of inadequate funding not all identified health workers were trained.
A number of disease specific guidelines were developed in 2009 and these include guide-
lines for cholera, typhoid, anthrax and rabies. These were distributed to all health facilities as 
resource materials for reference and guidance should they meet any of the conditions in their 
areas of work.
The UN established the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in 2008 
and the cluster system was formed. The main clusters that were formed were the Health 
Cluster, with WHO as cluster lead, the WASH Cluster, under UNICEF, the Food Cluster 
(FAO), Education (UNICEF) and Protection (UNHCR and IOM). As Ministry of Health struc-
tures were not functional at the time, the Health Cluster established the Cholera Command 
and Control Centre (C4), which became the response organ and nerve center for the cholera 
response at the WHO offices located at Parirenyatwa Hospital grounds. Technical experts 
including clinicians, epidemiologists, water and sanitation specialists, health promotion 
officers, data managers and administration staff were engaged to work in the C4. A Health 
Cluster Coordinator post was established and filled. The WHO mobilized experts through 
global outbreak alert and response network (GOARN), and these experts were from United 
States, Centers for Disease Control (CDC), International Centre for Diarrheal Disease 
Research, Bangladesh (ICDDRB), Burnet Institute Australia and SMI Sweden among others. 
Surveillance centers were strategically established throughout the country, and toll free lines 
were set up for surveillance and real time data transmission to C4.
Cluster Coordination System was established and continued until 2012. The Health Cluster 
was abolished in 2012, and the Interagency Coordination Committee on Health (IACCH) was 
re-established, and this coordination system is chaired by the Ministry of Health and Child 
Care (MOHCC). The C4 brought in the concept of the Public Health Emergency Operations 
Center (PHEOC) and a room within the MOHCC headquarters was set aside for the purpose.
Community health workers who had almost disappeared in the system were resuscitated 
following strong recommendations from the C4 and the finding that a significant proportion 
of the 2008/2009 cholera cases and deaths had been in the community. The Village Health 
Worker (VHW) training curriculum was reviewed, and the training resuscitated. Through 
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the support of stakeholders, and using the updated IDSR technical guidelines of 2008, the 
training has been ongoing since then and the numbers have been increasing steadily, and 
this greatly improving community health surveillance, awareness and reporting of public 
health events. Village Health Workers were found very useful in the recent Chegutu cholera 
outbreak of 2018, supporting in health promotion and surveillance.
The 2008/2009 cholera outbreak in the country drew a lot of interest from the local and inter-
national scenes including journalists, scientists and human rights activists [17–22]. From the 
documentation on the various themes pertaining to this outbreak the country remains with a 
wealth of information to learn from and avoid similar situations from happening in the future.
4.3. Reaping the results of building resilience: Response to cholera in the aftermath
It should be noted that during and following the 2008/2009 outbreak many positive steps 
were taken, including:
• Mobilizing resources for supporting and retaining core health workers through the Global 
Fund, Health Transition fund and other donors.
• Pooling resources for maintaining core health at the primary level through the supply of 
primary care packages by a mechanism called Zimbabwe Informed Push System.
• Development of key guidelines and training materials for RRTs, IDSR and cholera, typhoid, 
anthrax and rabies guidelines which are in use to date.
• Training of core health staff in updated IDSR and rapid response.
• Establishment of the cluster coordination systems and the C4 as a precursor to PHEOC.
• Revitalization of the Village Health Worker program.
As a result of the devastation left by the 2008/2009 outbreak, the affected communities still 
remember the impact this deadly disease can inflict on them. As a result of this the coopera-
tion of the community in the cholera outbreaks following the 2008/2009 outbreak has been 
exemplary. We describe some important outbreaks to show how the detection and response 
has been improved.
4.3.1. Chiredzi cholera outbreak: May 2012
Chiredzi was the only district which had an outbreak in 2012. This outbreak which, was 
controlled within one month, remained localized in Chiredzi and resulted in 22 cases and 
1 community death. Although the control took longer than the country’s target of control 
within two weeks, the country’s efforts to control this outbreak were commendable and the 
time taken to control the outbreak was much shorter that the 2008/2009 outbreak which took 
more than six months.
On the 3rd of May 2012 a case of cholera was reported to a RHC in Chiredzi district in a 30 year 
old man from a village in the communal areas. Thereafter a number of cases were seen mostly 
from three neighboring villages. The local response was swift in detection, reporting and 
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responding to the initial cases. The Secretary for Health and Child Welfare sent the Director 
Epidemiology and Disease Control and Provincial Medical Director (PMD) Masvingo on 
an urgent directive to plan swift action and ensure adequate control of the Chiredzi chol-
era outbreak. Following communications with the PMD, the National RRT comprising the 
Director Epidemiology and Disease Control, Deputy Director Environmental Health, Health 
Promotion and Laboratory Services, WHO, the Environmental Health Alliance (German Agro 
Action-GAA and Save the Children-SC), European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid 
Operations (ECHO) and the Masvingo Provincial Health Executive teamed up on a support 
visit to Chiredzi. The National RRT was joined by the PMD, Provincial Environmental Health 
Officer, Chiredzi District Health Executive (DHE), Save the Children and Action Against 
Hunger (ACF). Investigations conducted pointed to an adult female who fell ill on 27th April 
2012 with diarrhea and vomiting, and subsequently died at home on the 28th of April, as 
the index case. This cholera suspect had sought treatment from a traditional healer. She was 
buried on the 1st of May in her village. The burial was not supervised because cholera had 
not been suspected. Thereafter cases started presenting at a local health facility, three of them 
with a history of having attended this unsupervised burial.
4.3.1.1. Response measures
The PMD dispatched the provincial RRT to support Chiredzi on 7 May. They investigated, 
provided supplies and supported the district RRT and the partners on the ground, who had 
already set up a cholera treatment center (CTC) at the health facility on May 5th. Thereafter 
there was regular communication between the local, district and provincial teams, and updates 
to the Provincial Administrator’s office. The Chiredzi DHE mobilized one nurse from a mis-
sion hospital and three EHTs, one from each of surrounding health institutions, all motorized 
to boost the staff at health facility receiving cholera patients. The team received support from 
local partners which included ACF, Save the Children and Plan International. Together they 
conducted active surveillance, contact tracing, decontamination of infected patients’ homes 
and conducted participatory health and hygiene trainings for the affected villages.
Supplies were said to be adequate; diarrhea kits and laboratory consumables were received from 
the C4 through Save the Children. Some of the supplies were received from ACF and Plan inter-
national. The district also had left over supplies from the past outbreaks. A CTC and two Cholera 
Treatment Units (CTUs) were set up in health facilities in the catchment area. Case management 
protocols were delivered to the CTC and were used to guide patient management and staff 
managing patients had received training in cholera, typhoid and dysentery case management. 
On discharge the patients received health education; IEC materials, aqua tablets, and soap. The 
staff seconded were initially doubling up the clinic duties and those at the CTC until they were 
provided relief. ORT was made available at community level through EHTs and VHWs.
The district laboratory was supported with consumables to conduct rapid diagnostic tests 
(RDT), culture and sensitivity tests. Laboratory support for this outbreak was very commend-
able with results of rapid test conducted as well as culture and sensitivity, and with good 
correlation between the RDT and culture results. Vibrio cholerae, serogroup O1, biotype El Tor, 
Inaba serotype, was isolated. This was the first time in many years that Inaba has been isolated 
in Chiredzi, Ogawa having dominated in the previous outbreaks.
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The district had an average of two nurses manning each RHC. At any one time therefore 
one was likely to find just one trained nurse as a result of capacity building sessions and 
workshops being conducted from time to time on the various ministry programs, and at times 
the nurse aides were left on their own attending to patients. This was the case when the first 
cholera case presented to the health facility on the 3rd of May. Fortunately the nurse aide had 
attended to cholera patients during the 2008/2009 outbreak and quickly raised the alarm with 
the district, resulting in the swift outbreak response that ensued.
4.3.2. Chegutu cholera outbreak 2018
Chegutu cholera outbreak is one of the most recent cholera outbreaks the country faced. This 
outbreak had the potential to escalate into a massive outbreak because of the prevailing water 
and sanitation situation in the town, the easy link between the town and the capital, Harare 
City, which also had worse water and sanitation situation and being a link between the two 
major cities of the country, Harare and Bulawayo. However because of the built in resilience 
anchoring on health worker capacity, availability of extension workers, swiftness of response 
by RRTs and coordination of response through the Civil Protection Committee at district level 
and IACCH at national level, the outbreak was controlled in 20 days with 106 cases and 4 
deaths reported. It should be noted that the four deaths were the alert which occurred before 
the outbreak was detected.
On the 16th of January 2018, a report was made to the Chegutu District Medical Office of an 
increase in diarrhea cases at Chegutu Hospital in a male ward in which two cases had died. 
A follow up visit was made to the male ward and revealed that there were three male cases 
presenting with watery diarrhea and vomiting. Two deaths had occurred and a stool speci-
men had been collected from one of the deceased patients and sent to hospital laboratory for 
culture. The result was received on the 19th of January 2018 confirming Vibrio cholerae. The 
national office was immediately notified on the 19th of January 2018 who also notified WHO 
on the 22nd of January.
Subsequent investigations revealed that all cases and deaths were associated with a funeral 
which had occurred in Pfupajena Township of Chegutu on the 8th of January 2018. A visit 
made to the given address revealed that the deceased (index case) had reported for treatment 
suffering from diarrhea and vomiting at a local private clinic before her death on the same 
day. The daughter to the index case also reported for treatment at Chegutu hospital on the 9th 
of January 2018 where she was admitted and discharged on the 11th. A stool specimen was 
collected and the results were negative.
It was further established that there was a funeral which occurred on the 29th of December 
2017 in the same neighborhood which was attended by two relatives from Zambia (Zambia 
was at the time experiencing a cholera outbreak). Among those who attended the funeral 
were members of a religious group who later visited the index case. It is highly possible that 
the source of infection could have been from those who came from Zambia who could have 
been healthy carriers.
On notification of the national office, the Minister of Health and Child Care immediately vis-
ited the area together with members of the National RRT to assess the situation and advise on 
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the correct course of action in support of actions that had already started. Isolation of patients 
requiring hospitalization and appropriate rehydration, infection prevention and control in 
the hospital, safe and dignified burials, water quality monitoring and health promotion activi-
ties were already ongoing.
A follow up visit by the Minister of Health and Child Care was on the 20th of January, team-
ing up with the local member of parliament and a minister colleague in the president’s office, 
in the company of the WHO Officer In Charge, to provide further support to teams on the 
ground and assess the evolution of the outbreak. On the 20th of January, the National RRT 
together with the District RRT worked together with the Civil Protection Committee, chaired 
by the District Administrator and allocated tasks to teams on the following thematic areas: (i) 
Coordination, (ii) logistics, (iii) Case management and surveillance, (iv) Health and hygiene 
promotion (v) Water, Sanitation and hygiene. The teams became immediately operational 
with coordination meetings taking place twice a day at district level. Community members 
were trained to participate in contact tracing. A treatment camp was set up to receive patients 
for diagnosis and treatment. Food premises were inspected and those not meeting minimum 
health requirements closed. Water quality monitoring was carried out and samples taken for 
testing.
At National level the IACCH started coordination meetings on a weekly basis with the 
National RRT having daily coordination meetings. A cholera preparedness and response plan 
was developed and used to guide the response. Gaps in the response were identified and 
filled by the donor community, UN, NGOs and the private sector.
5. Discussion
Among the major issues we single out as having been strengthened over the years are the 
political commitment, multisectoral engagement, capacity to harness resources and coordi-
nate actors, surveillance and RRT and, the health system capacity.
Political commitment is evidenced by the personal involvement of the Minister and other 
senior MOHCC staff, provincial and district health leadership. The role of political commit-
ment in implementation of health programs is emphasized in literature and indeed effec-
tive institutionalization of cholera control measures has been reported in Mexico following 
the recognition of cholera as a national security problem [27]. The central role of high level 
political commitment in instituting rapid response measures and mobilization of resources is 
underscored [27]. Leadership at high level is a necessity for the response if properly managed, 
but in situations where it is not properly managed [28] it may lead to conflicts among workers 
in the field thereby delaying the implementation of activities and allowing the prolonged 
progression of the outbreak. Liberia offers a good example of proper coordination of response 
with high political leadership during the Ebola outbreak [29]. In the Zimbabwe cholera out-
break of 2008–2009, the failure by the political leadership to accept that a cholera outbreak 
was brewing led to delays in the response allowing uncontrolled continued infection and the 
resultant mortality. In years after 2008/2009 outbreak, political leadership has been prominent 
in all the outbreaks and their control within reasonable time can be explained.
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We also note the importance of multisectoral engagement in emergency response and in par-
ticular, these reported recent cholera outbreaks. Multisectoral engagement is observed in the 
name of the cluster system during the cholera outbreak of 2008/2009, the civil protection com-
mittees at various levels led by the ministry of local government and the IACCH, all for the 
purposes of streamlining and coordinating the response. The success of controlling the cholera 
outbreaks is built upon functional multisectoral engagement. The Global Task Force on Cholera 
Control’s Ending Cholera—A Global roadmap to 2030, recognizes multisectoral engagement 
as one of the three key axis for cholera control [30]. The key cholera drivers are largely known 
and most of them are outside the health sector. The tools for prevention and control of cholera 
outbreaks are also known to work and anchor on improving access to clean water and improv-
ing sanitation, improving community awareness and hygiene practices including the hand 
washing [10–13]. The health sector is mainly responsible for responding to outbreaks in terms 
of case management and surveillance. The requirement of multisectoral engagement becomes 
more important realizing the limitations of the health sector in cholera prevention efforts.
Over the years Zimbabwe has witnessed rapid response to, and reducing case fatality rates 
from, cholera. The investments made over the years to strengthen the health system partly 
explain this phenomenon given the fact that the cholera case fatality rate reflects the access 
to basic health care [31]. Availability of HRH, strengthened surveillance and improved avail-
ability of basic commodities have been realized over the years. The per capita expenditure on 
health increased from $9 in 2009 to $24 in 2015. Regarding retention of health workers, aver-
age in-post rate stands at 81% [32]. Indeed the Ebola viral diseases outbreak in West Africa 
brought to the fore the central role of strengthened health systems in responding to diseases 
outbreaks [3, 4, 33].
The presence of skilled rapid response teams, especially following the scale up of training 
following the 2008/2009 cholera outbreaks, as well as the recent training sessions in response 
to the typhoid outbreaks in Harare, has improved the capacity of health workers to manage 
epidemics. Health worker capacity for rapid detection and swift control of outbreaks is essen-
tial in emergency preparedness and response [34]. RRTs which are multidisciplinary teams 
ensure this takes place and where they are functional this has led to reduced mortality and 
shortened period for control [35]. The timing of activation of RRTs is also important for good 
outcome for delayed activation may also lead to increased mortality.
Correct information is necessary for the communities to take appropriate action to prevent 
infection or to get immediate assistance when they get infected [36, 37]. The sustained infor-
mation dissemination through the district structures made the people’s perception of risk 
remain high and to quickly adopt responsible behaviors as advised. Majority of the popula-
tion anywhere in Zimbabwe still remember and reminisce the events of 2008/2009 which left 
them devastated and hence are very responsive to behavior change communication messages. 
Lessons from the field show us that when inadequate information is given it may lead to 
information gaps allowing unorthodox sources to lead with misinformation resulting in panic 
or inappropriate actions [3]. On the other hand clear information dissemination on a regular 
basis from trusted sources has led to communities taking part in the response measures lead-
ing to rapid containment of epidemics as reported in Uganda during an EVD outbreak the 
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country faced [3]. Furthermore, surveillance is a key requirement for epidemic detection and 
control. Zimbabwe has registered improvement in this area and has built capacity for real 
time reporting. This has enabled fast detection and response to outbreaks. Capacitation of 
health workers in IDSR has improved their interpretation and use of data at local level.
6. Conclusion
Emergencies and in particular outbreaks of infectious hazards remain a global concern. The 
IHR (2005) together with other guiding documents on specific themes on emergency pre-
paredness and response remain available to guide countries in building capacities for emer-
gency preparedness and response. The capacity of countries to mount adequate response to 
control emergencies depend on the resilience of their health systems build upon organiza-
tional, community and individual resilience and to a large extent dependent health systems 
institutional capacities as defined by the WHO health systems building blocks.
Zimbabwe having gone through a period of economic difficulties, faced one of its worst ever 
cholera outbreaks, which resulted in high rates of infection and deaths. This being said the 
country managed to use this event as a stepping stone which has resulted in the country build-
ing resilience to mount adequate response to outbreaks in the recent years. Understandably, 
resilience is not an all or none event but a process with levels of attributes, and Zimbabwe 
continues to work towards achieving all resilience attributes. Other countries can learn from 
Zimbabwe’s experience to build resilience.
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